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Dornbach v. Tenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 33 (May 15, 2014)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: DISCOVERY
Summary
The Court determined two issues: (1) whether the NRCP 16.1(e) time period begins to
run when the defendant appears or answers and (2) whether a district court may consider its own
internal delays when justifying a deadline extension.
Disposition
The time periods set forth in NRCP 16.1(e) begin to run when the defendant appears,
regardless of whether the appearance is by motion or answer, and a district court may find that its
own internal delays constitute compelling and extraordinary circumstances, thus justifying a
deadline extension.
Factual and Procedural History
On December 6, 2011, plaintiffs, Ellingwood, filed a complaint against petitioner,
Dornbach, for a deficiency judgment. On February 7, 2012, Dornbach filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5); however, due to the death of the only
sitting district judge, a hearing for the motion did not occur until January 7, 2013. While the
motion remained pending, Dornbach did not file an answer to plaintiffs’ complaint, and, on
December 6, 2012, 284 days after Dornbach had filed the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion, Dornbach
filed a motion to dismiss the case without prejudice due to plaintiffs’ failure to comply with
NRCP 16.1(e).
Although the district court recognized plaintiffs’ failure, it denied Dornbach’s motion,
reasoning that the death of the judge and the resulting delays constituted compelling and
extraordinary circumstances that justified extending the NRCP 16.1 deadline. Dornbach sought a
writ of mandamus to compel the district court to dismiss the case.
Discussion
Dornbach argues that the district court improperly denied his NRCP 16.1 motion and
ordered the parties to meet and confer after the deadlines had expired.
Whether to consider the petition for a writ of mandamus
Generally, the Nevada Supreme Court "decline[s] to consider writ petitions that
challenge interlocutory district court orders denying motions to dismiss" because appeals from
pos a final judgment provide an adequate remedy.2 However, if an important issue of law needs
clarification and if considerations of judicial economy and administration militate in favor of
granting the petition, this Court may consider writ petitions. Here, NRCP 16.1 is relevant in
almost all civil cases, and our consideration of this petition promotes judicial economy and
administration because the questions were presented early in the proceedings and cannot
adequately be addressed on appeal.
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Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197-98, 179 P.3d 556, 558-59 (2008).

The meaning of “appearance” in NRCP 16.1(e)
NRCP 16(b)(1) requires a plaintiff to hold an early case conference within 30 days after
the defendant files an answer to the complaint; the deadline may be extended no later than 180
days from when the defendant’s appearance is served, unless compelling and extraordinary
circumstances justify an extension. Additionally, NRCP 16.1(c) requires the parties to file a
report regarding the conference within 30 days after the conference. NRCP 16.1(e) then dictates
that if plaintiffs in civil cases fail to have a case conference within 180 days or to file a case
conference report within 240 days after an appearance, a district court may dismiss the
complaint without prejudice under NRCP 16.1(e) and sanction the attorney.
Here, both parties disagree as to when Dornbach’s appearance occurred. Dornbach argues
that he first appeared by filing the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss; whereas, Ellingwood
argues that Dornbach should not be deemed to have appeared until he actually files an answer to
the complaint. An “appearance is a coming into court as a party or interested person, . . .
especially a defendant’s act of taking part in a lawsuit . . . by answer, demurrer, or motion.” An
“answer is a defendant’s first pleading that addresses the merits of the case.” The time periods
set forth in NRCP 16(e) begin when a defendant appears, regardless of whether it is by motion or
answer. Thus, Dornbach appeared when he filed the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion and, thus, the NRCP
16.1(e) deadlines expired before he filed the NRCP 16.1(e) motion to dismiss.
The district court did not arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion by denying
Dornbach’s motion to dismiss
Dornbach argues that the District court’s reasoning was arbitrary because a court’s
internal delays is not among the factors used when deciding an NRCP 16.1(e) motion to dismiss
as established by precedent. These factors include: “the length of the delay, whether the
defendant… caused the delay, whether the delay has impeded the timely prosecution of the case,
general considerations of case management…, or whether the plaintiff has provided good cause
for the delay.”3 However, this list of factors is “nonexhaustive.”4 Here, Dornbach did not answer
plaintiffs’ complaint, and, even though plaintiffs were required to hold an early case conference
regardless of their complaint being answered, doing so may have been fruitless. Additionally, the
district court’s internal delays are relevant to general considerations of case management; thus
the court’s consideration regarding the internal delays was not improper.
The district court did not arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion by ordering the
parties to comply with NRCP 16.1 after the deadlines expired
The district court found that the death of the district judge and the resulting delays were
extraordinary circumstances; therefore, an extension of the deadline for the conference was
justified. This was not a arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. NRCP 16.1(b)(1) does not
state that the compelling and extraordinary circumstances cannot arise from within the district
court itself and the court’s consideration of its own delays may be relevant when justifying an
extension.

3
4

Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 415–16, 168 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2007).
Id.

Conclusion
The time periods set forth in NRCP 16.1(e) began to run when defendant appeared by
filing a NRCP 12(b)(5) motion, not when he filed an answer. Thus, the deadlines expired before
Dornbach filed a motion to dismiss. However, as the district court found, its own internal delays
constituted compelling and extraordinary circumstances, excusing plaintiffs’ delay and justifying
an extension to complete the early case conference and report. The petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.

